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effects of these phase change genes 
and elucidate the regulatory networks 
involved.
How and why do swarms form? 
Weather plays a critical role in 
locust population growth and swarm 
formation, because it promotes 
growth of host plants and provides 
soil moisture for egg development. 
Individual-based computer simulations, 
laboratory and field experiments have 
shown that the fine-scale spatial 
distribution and quality of resources 
in the habitat can either promote or 
deter contact among individuals, and 
hence influence the probability of 
locusts entering the gregarious phase. 
Clumping of food plants or areas of 
favourable microclimate encourages 
solitarious locusts to come into contact 
and gregarise, despite their initial 
tendency to be repelled by one another. 
In contrast, more dispersed resources 
allow solitarious locusts to avoid one 
another and inhibit gregarisation. 
The expression of phase 
polyphenism itself may enhance 
local population growth and promote 
further gregarisation by altering local 
ecological interactions. Juvenile  
S. gregaria in pre-outbreak populations 
feed on a variety of plants that contain 
secondary compounds toxic to 
vertebrates, and they become even 
more willing to do so as they become 
gregarious. When this happens, their 
conspicuous gregarious phase colour 
patterns serve as a warning colouration 
to vertebrate predators, signalling that 
the locusts are toxic prey by virtue of 
feeding on noxious plants. Gregarious 
S. gregaria are also more resistant to 
pathogen infection than solitarious 
individuals, another adaptation to life in 
a crowd that will reduce mortality and 
contribute to local population growth.
Why do locusts mass migrate? 
Locust swarms often fly with prevailing 
winds that take them to regions where 
air masses may collide, produce 
rainfall, and potentially generate 
suitable habitat. Until recently, the 
mechanisms and adaptive significance 
of migratory band movements over 
smaller scales on the ground was 
largely unknown. In part because of 
the comparative studies involving 
the migratory band-forming Mormon 
cricket (Anabrus simplex), the past few 
years have seen the rapid development 
of a unifying framework that explains 
both how and why such mass 
movements occur. It has been shown 
that bands form as an anti-predator 
strategy in which individuals are much 
less likely to be killed by predators than 
insects that are on their own. Despite 
this benefit, band members suffer from 
increased intraspecific competition 
for nutritional resources as well as 
an increased risk of cannibalism by 
other hungry band members. These 
costs, in turn, are precisely the factors 
that drive the subsequent mass 
movement of individuals in migratory 
bands. Migratory bands are a “forced 
march” driven by cannibalism, in which 
individuals must keep moving both to 
find new resources and avoid being 
attacked by cannibalistic conspecifics 
approaching from behind. 
Because swarms are composed of 
many interacting individuals, locusts 
are powerful model organisms for 
studies of collective movement. The 
group-level movement patterns of 
migratory bands and flying swarms 
are similar to those observed in many 
other animals, suggesting that general 
mechanisms underlie collective 
movement across taxa. In fact, the 
laws generating collective movement 
in animals may be so general that 
they can be modelled as interacting 
particles. Self-propelled particle 
models developed for statistical 
physicists have recently been used 
to explain transition from wandering 
individuals to cohesive marching locust 
bands at high population density. 
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Kevin N. Laland
For most biologists, ‘culture’ is 
either some agar-bound growth in a 
Petri dish or the nebulous domain of 
fashion, art and theatre that lies at 
the edge of scientific understanding. 
For an increasing number of animal 
behaviourists, however, ‘culture’ 
has a quite different meaning: the 
learning and social transmission 
of knowledge and skills among 
animals. The best- known examples 
include the opening of milk bottles 
to drink cream by European birds, 
the washing of food by Japanese 
macaques, and the habit, of some 
East African chimpanzees, of fishing 
for termites with stalks. Animals 
as diverse as ants, sticklebacks 
and killer whales are now known 
to pick up foraging skills, dietary 
preferences, mating preferences and 
predator evasion tactics, and to learn 
calls, songs, and migratory routes, 
by observing more experienced 
others. But the claim that humans 
are not the only species immersed 
in a cultural realm is shrouded in 
controversy.
Why study animal culture?
Why is culture of interest? Many 
people who study animal cultures, 
particularly primatologists, do so 
because they believe their research 
will shed light on the evolution of 
human cognition. Animal social 
learning, it is argued, lies at the 
roots of human culture. If we can 
get to grips with termite fishing 
in chimpanzees or macaque food 
washing, they surmise, we can gain 
insights into homologous processes 
that led to the emergence of ‘full-
blown’ culture in humans, the 
conditions that favored the cognitive 
underpinnings of our own cultural 
capability, or the evolutionary 
trajectory of our cultural ancestors. 
Whatever the merits of that 
argument, from the evolutionary 
biologist’s perspective, animal 
culture is inherently interesting. That 
is, there are broader issues that 
validate investigating animal cultural 
processes over and above the light 
such study sheds on our own species. 
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is that culture is a source of adaptive 
behavior; individuals can efficiently 
acquire solutions to problems such 
as ‘what to eat?’ and ‘with whom to 
mate?’ simply by copying others. 
The fascination of culture, 
however, also relates to its ability 
to propagate behavior in a manner 
that is to some degree independent 
of the ecological environment. 
For instance, it is a fundamental 
assumption of evolutionary biology 
that natural selection will shape 
organisms to reflect environmental 
conditions. However, culture can 
violate this premise; it can cause 
the characteristics of organisms 
to become partially disconnected 
from their environments. This is 
most obvious in humans where 
studies of different societies have 
found that most human behavioral 
and social traits correlate with 
cultural history — were handed 
down as traditions — rather than 
with a society’s ecology. The same 
applies to at least some animals. 
Bluehead wrasse mating sites, for 
instance, cannot be predicted from 
knowledge of environmental resource 
distributions. Rather, removal and 
replacement experiments demonstrate 
that mating sites are maintained as 
‘traditions’, for multiple generations, 
with young fish and newcomers 
adopting the mating sites of residents.
Culture can also generate 
patterns of phenotypic variation in 
space. Evolutionary biologists and 
ecologists set out to understand the 
processes underlying geographical 
variation in gene frequencies and 
phenotypic characters. However, 
cultural processes, like gene-
frequency clines, can generate 
geographical patterns in behavioral 
phenotypes. Clines in behavioral 
characteristics attributed to 
culture have been reported for 
primate behavior, birdsong, whale 
vocalizations and human language.
A third challenging feature of 
cultural transmission is that, under 
restricted circumstances, arbitrary 
and even maladaptive information 
can spread. Once again, this is well 
documented in humans, where 
fitness-reducing habits, such as 
smoking or contraceptive use, can 
become fashionable. However, there 
are instances where arbitrary and 
maladaptive traits appear to spread 
among animals too. An example 
is informational cascades, where 
individuals base behavioral decisions 
on prior decisions of others. If animals 
think that a particular behaviour must 
be good because others are doing it, 
then all kinds of arbitrary traditions 
can result. A study of lekking sage 
grouse found that the decisions of 
females using social information 
to decide with whom to mate were 
less closely correlated with male 
traits indicating quality than were the 
decisions of females making their 
own judgments about males. This 
copying of mate choices obscures 
the relationship between male quality 
and mating success, resulting in 
unpredictable ‘fads’ in the characters 
that females find attractive and a 
lower intensity of sexual selection. 
This is not to say that the capability 
for social learning is a maladaptive 
trait, but rather that the occasional 
transmission and acquisition of 
maladaptive information is an 
unavoidable byproduct of a largely 
adaptive knowledge-gaining system.
Moreover, cultural traditions often 
impact on the environment to modify 
the selection acting on the population, 
an instance of niche construction. 
This is most obvious in humans 
and a great deal of mathematical 
theory by evolutionary biologists and 
anthropologists has investigated 
gene–culture co-evolution, whereby 
human cultural traits modify the 
selective environment. A good 
example is the cultural practice of 
dairy farming, which spread prior 
to the allele for lactose absorption, 
creating the environmental context 
in which this gene was favoured in 
some pastoralist societies. Similar 
interactions occur in other animals: 
theoretical models of mate-choice 
copying have revealed that learned 
preferences could plausibly co-evolve 
with gene-based traits, models of 
birdsong suggest that song learning 
affects the selection of alleles 
influencing song acquisition and 
preference, and other models have 
found that animal social learning 
could lead to the evolution of brood 
parasitism, affect levels of genetic 
diversity, and facilitate speciation. 
Such gene–culture co-evolution 
is suggested by the observation 
that the frequency of social learning 
usage co- varies with brain size in 
non- human primates. It would seem 
that big-brained primates copy each 
other more than do small-brained 
primates; they also invent more 
novel behaviour. This has led to the 
suggestion that the ability to learn 
from others, and to devise novel 
solutions to challenging problems, 
may have given individual primates 
a selective advantage in the struggle 
for existence. Since these abilities 
are no doubt underpinned by neural 
substrate, it is conceivable that the 
capabilities for social learning and 
innovation could have driven brain 
evolution in primates, culminating in 
Homo sapiens, the most innovative 
and most culturally dependent primate 
with the largest brain.
In short, cultural processes in a 
broad range of animal species exhibit 
a number of properties that change 
the evolutionary dynamic, including 
detaching the behaviour of animals 
from their ecological environments, 
generating geographical patterns 
in phenotypic characters, allowing 
arbitrary and even maladaptive 
characters to spread, influencing 
evolutionary rates and trajectories, 
and modifying selection to precipitate 
and direct evolutionary events. This 
different way of adapting and evolving 
is not unique to humans but shared 
with many other species capable of 
social learning, including species only 
distantly related to ourselves. Animal 
culture is much more than a window 
onto humanity: it is an evolutionary 
player.
The animal cultures debate
Groups of white-faced capuchin 
monkeys in Costa Rica exhibit 
extraordinary and bizarre social 
conventions, sniffing each other’s 
hands and placing fingers in each 
other’s mouths, behaviors not seen 
in other capuchin populations. 
Some orangutans in Borneo make 
leaf- bundle ‘dolls’, others use tools 
as sexual stimulants, and still other 
orangutans blow raspberries at 
bedtime. Humpback whales from 
different regions sing different songs, 
as do white crowned sparrows and a 
host of other bird species.
At first sight, such reports of 
behavioral differences among 
species members living in different 
locations are evocative of human 
cultural variation. Just as people from 
different regions of the world eat 
different foods, have varying customs 
and speak different languages, 
some animals also appear to have 
local traditions. Much circumstantial 
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Social learning processes: definitions and examples.
Social learning: any process through which one individual (‘the demonstrator’) 
 influences the behaviour of another individual (‘the observer’) in a manner that 
 increases the probability that the observer learns.
Various social learning processes have been proposed, including:
Local enhancement: a demonstrator inadvertently attracts an observer to a specific 
location, leading to the observer learning.
Example. Naïve guppies follow informed individuals to food.
Stimulus enhancement: a demonstrator inadvertently exposes an observer to a 
 particular stimulus, leading to the observer learning.
Example. Blue tits learn to open milk-bottle tops faster after being exposed to bottles 
opened by other birds.
Observational conditioning: a demonstrator’s behaviour inadvertently exposes an 
observer to a relationship between stimuli, allowing the observer to form an association 
between them. 
Example. Blackbirds learn to recognise predators through observing birds mobbing 
unfamiliar objects.
Response facilitation: the presence of a demonstrator performing an act increases 
the probability of an animal that sees it doing the same, leading to the observer 
 learning.
Example. The rate at which chickens initiate bouts of preening is strongly related to the 
number of birds already preening in the same locality.
Contextual imitation: through observing a demonstrator perform an action in a 
 specific context, an observer becomes more likely to perform that action in the same 
context.
Example. Pigeons that watch demonstrators step or peck on a treadle for a food reward 
are more likely to solve the task using the method they had seen.
Production imitation: after observing a demonstrator perform a novel action, sequence 
or combination of actions, an observer becomes more likely to perform that same 
 action or sequence of actions.
Example. Humans learn tennis strokes and improve golf swings through observing 
sports coaches.
Emulation: after observing a demonstrator interacting with objects in its environment, 
an observer becomes more likely to act to bring about a similar effect on those objects.
Example. Chimpanzees learn to gain out-of-reach food with a tool through observing a 
demonstrator, but do not reproduce its motor pattern.and some experimental evidence 
suggests that these traditions are 
learned from others, and handed 
down across generations. But are the 
similarities between animal ‘cultures’ 
and those of humans meaningful or 
superficial?
Part of the disagreement over 
animal culture is definitional, reflecting 
diverse perspectives across academic 
disciplines: here biologists tend to 
employ less exacting definitions 
than do anthropologists. However, 
the controversy is more over the 
evidence necessary to establish that 
within-species behavioural variation 
results from social learning rather than 
from genetic differences or the way 
diverse ecologies shape behavioral 
development. Researchers vary in the 
degree to which they are willing to rely on circumstantial evidence and 
plausibility arguments, with laboratory 
experimentalists and field researchers 
often taking different sides. Common 
chimpanzees, for instance, are very 
good at social learning; experimental 
demonstrations in captivity clearly 
show that they are capable of 
transmitting learned foraging skills 
through populations, while in the field 
behavioural repertoires vary between 
populations, with youngsters spending 
long hours close to competent 
adults foraging, before adopting the 
local variants. In other words, the 
circumstantial support for chimpanzee 
culture is strong. However, for no 
single natural chimpanzee behaviour, 
including termite fishing and nut 
cracking, is there conclusive evidence 
that it is socially learned. This issue is likely to be resolved 
within the next decade, as new 
mathematical and experimental 
methods are developed for identifying 
social learning in animal populations. 
Many such tools, which include an 
array of statistical methods, are 
currently in development, and offer 
great promise for the future. Countless 
species, from oystercatchers to 
orangutans, exhibit inter-population 
variation in their behavioural 
repertoires, and in all probability 
the next decade will confirm that a 
sizeable proportion of this variation is 
cultural.
Mechanisms of culture
Behavioural traditions are not 
restricted to clever or large-brained 
animals: laboratory and field 
studies imply that a capacity for 
social learning is taxonomically 
widespread among animals, including 
invertebrates. There are now, quite 
literally, many hundreds of reports of 
novel behaviour patterns increasing 
in frequency over time, too rapidly 
to be plausibly interpreted as 
manifestations of selection, migration 
or demographics. It would seem such 
animals must be learning their new 
behaviour, and to all appearances they 
seem to be learning from each other. 
Combined with the aforementioned 
inter-populational variation in 
behaviour, the data from the field 
imply that social learning is pervasive.
We can also be fairly certain that 
animal social learning is multi- faceted 
in its underlying mechanisms. 
Laboratory studies, largely carried 
out by experimental psychologists, 
reveal a multitude of means by which 
one animal can learn from another. 
The question of whether animals learn 
by imitating others has attracted an 
especially high level of interest, since 
imitation is often assumed to rely on 
complex cognitive processes — such 
as an ability to understand what 
the other is doing, or to adopt 
another’s perspective, or even 
conscious awareness — assumptions 
that remain highly contentious. 
Nonetheless, reasonably compelling 
evidence for imitation has been 
provided for a variety of species of 
birds, primates and cetaceans. 
Much effort has gone into defining 
alternative social learning processes 
that might superficially resemble 
imitation, and that must be ruled out 
if researchers are to isolate cases 
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(A) Nine-spined stickleback and (B) three-spined stickleback. Experimental studies reveal that nine-spined but not three-spined sticklebacks 
are capable of learning the richness of a food patch by observing other fish, a form of social learning known as ‘public-information use’. This 
difference, in two closely related species with very similar lifestyles, is thought to be an adaptive specialization in social learning. The weaker 
morphological defenses of the nine-spines leaves them more vulnerable to predation than the more robust three-spines, leading them to spend 
more time hiding in refuge, from where selection has seemingly fashioned their ability to monitor the success of others at food patches.of ‘true’ imitative learning. As a 
result, there are a plethora of terms 
used to describe different social 
learning phenomena, including local 
enhancement, stimulus enhancement, 
contagion, emulation, observational 
conditioning, and social facilitation 
(see Box 1). These, and other, terms 
have been organized into a number 
of classification schemes, but there 
is little consensus in the field over 
terminology or underlying mechanism: 
indeed considerable confusion and 
major differences of opinion remain. 
For instance, ‘imitation’ is frequently 
described as complex, and ‘local 
enhancement’ as simple, because, 
intuitively, reproducing a motor pattern 
through observation appears more 
challenging than having one’s attention 
directed to a location. However, there 
is currently little neuro- scientific 
basis to social learning research, 
and the processes described in 
classifications are not tied to neural 
mechanisms. In the absence of a 
strong biological understanding, 
such use of terms like ‘simple’ and 
‘complex’ could be profoundly 
misleading. It is, for instance, 
plausible that a large proportion of 
social learning phenomena can be 
understood as the result of a single 
psychological mechanism, priming 
(in which experience has at least 
a temporary effect on the relative 
probabilities of evoking stored mental 
representations). Also up for grabs is the relative 
frequency of alternative social 
learning processes in the natural 
world. For instance, it is widely 
thought that the processes of local 
and stimulus enhancement are 
common and imitation is rare in 
nature (see Box 1 for definitions). 
However, a recent review found 
just a handful of cases that could 
unambiguously be designated 
in the former categories, while 
the apparent rarity of imitation 
may merely reflect the stance, 
widely adopted within the field, 
that imitation can only be claimed 
when alternative processes have 
been ruled out. Ironically, response 
facilitation, a process that relatively 
few social learning researchers even 
recognize, is arguably the process 
that commands the most empirical 
support. Even the assumption that 
one or other of these processes 
will explain most natural cases of 
animal social learning is contestable: 
in any given instance, multiple 
processes may be operating, while 
there can be little confidence that 
current classification schemes are 
non-overlapping or complete. Once 
again, however, there are grounds for 
confidence that these uncertainties 
will be eroded in the near future, 
since experimental studies that 
disassociate alternative social 
learning processes increasingly 
appear.Evolution of culture
The extent to which the learning 
abilities of animals are shaped by 
natural selection in response to 
species-specific ecological challenges 
or general processes that vary little 
across taxa has long been a matter of 
contention. This issue lay at the centre 
of the debate between ethologists 
and comparative psychologists 
from the 1940s to 1960s, and has 
resurfaced in recent discussions of 
evolutionary psychology and cognitive 
ecology. However, some consensus 
is beginning to appear. While many 
learning mechanisms are extremely 
general, there is limited evidence for 
psychological mechanisms that guide 
and direct learning and associated 
perceptual processes in response 
to specific ecological problems. For 
example, scatter-hoarding birds like 
the marsh tit can store and retrieve 
many hundreds of food items, while 
non-storing members of the same 
genus do not seem to possess this 
spatial memory capacity. Similar 
adaptive specializations in social 
learning exist. When exposed to 
songs of multiple species, juveniles of 
a number of bird species preferentially 
learn conspecific song, while several 
monkeys appear predisposed by past 
natural selection to acquire a fear of 
snakes (as opposed to other objects) 
on seeing other monkeys behave 
fearfully in the presence of a  
snake.
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Chimpanzees infer 
the location of a 
reward on the basis 
of the effect of its 
weight
Daniel Hanus and Josep Call
The extent to which animals in 
general, and non-human primates 
in particular, understand physical 
causality is currently unclear [1,2]. 
One way to assess an animal’s 
causal understanding is to test its 
ability to analyze a causal chain 
backwards — to infer cause from 
an effect [3]. In the study reported 
here, chimpanzees saw a given 
outcome (effect) of an action 
and had to infer the preceding 
event (cause) in order to solve 
the problem. More specifically, 
subjects saw a banana being hidden 
inside one of two opaque cups 
mounted on opposite sides of a 
balanced beam, but they were kept 
ignorant about the banana’s exact 
location. Subsequently, the subjects 
witnessed the balance beam tilting 
to one side after the experimenter 
released it from its equilibrium 
position (the Balance condition). 
The chimpanzees preferentially (and 
from trial one) selected the lower, 
compared to the upper, cup. Two 
control conditions demonstrated 
that the chimpanzee subjects lacked 
an intrinsic preference for the lower 
cup when there was no movement 
involved (the Wedge condition) or 
when the balance beam was tilted 
by the experimenter’s action (the 
Non-causal balance condition). 
We conclude that the chimpanzee 
subjects of our experiments 
demonstrated evidence of causal 
inference based on an object’s 
weight.
In our experiments, the 
chimpanzee subjects selected 
the baited cup significantly above 
chance in the Balance condition 
(see the Supplemental data available 
on-line for details). We compared 
the Balance condition to two 
control conditions. In the Wedge 
condition, the cups were mounted 
CorrespondencesA particularly instructive example is an experimental study of 
public- information use (the ability 
to assess the quality of a resource 
on the basis of the success of other 
individuals) in two closely related 
species of sticklebacks (Figure 1). 
Isabelle Coolen and colleagues 
recently found that nine- spined 
sticklebacks, after watching 
conspecific or heterospecific 
‘demonstrator’ fish feeding at 
two patches, when tested alone, 
tend to approach the former 
location of the richer patch. As 
their observational experience was 
restricted to the relative success of 
their demonstrators, and potential 
alternative explanations could 
be ruled out, they surmised that 
nine- spined sticklebacks were 
capable of public- information use. 
However, three-spined sticklebacks, 
when subject to the same test, swam 
with equal frequency to the former 
locations of rich and poor patches. 
These species were collected from 
the same streams, frequently shoal 
together, and feed on similar foods. 
Why should one species and not the 
other exhibit this specific form of 
social learning?
The answer to this conundrum 
comes from a surprising source: 
mathematical analyses of the 
adaptive advantages of human 
culture. Californian anthropologists 
Rob Boyd and Peter Richerson 
postulated a costly information 
hypothesis, which proposes an 
evolutionary trade-off between 
reliable but costly self- acquired 
information and potentially 
less reliable but cheap socially 
transmitted information. Here, the 
relative cost of acquiring personal 
information varies between the 
two stickleback species, which 
determines the value of public 
information. Three-spines have large 
spines and armoured body plates, 
robust structural defenses that allow 
them to sample alternative food 
patches directly, in relative safety. 
Such sampling by nine-spines, which 
have weaker physical defenses, 
would leave them vulnerable to 
predation, and hence in fitness 
terms would be extremely costly. 
Consequently, nine-spines spend 
much of their time in refuge, from 
where selection seemingly has 
favoured the ability to monitor the 
foraging success of others. Further research confirms that this species 
difference is robust.
In fact, considerable evidence is 
accumulating among fish, birds and 
mammals that animals will ignore 
social information under specific 
and predictable circumstances. For 
instance, nine-spine sticklebacks 
will ignore public information if they 
have reliable, up-to-date personal 
information, yet switch to exploiting 
public information if their personal 
information is unreliable or outdated. 
Social and personal information are 
not weighted equally, and animals 
will toggle between the two in a 
conditional manner, according 
to their respective reliability and 
cost. Evolved rules, labelled 
social learning strategies, dictate 
the circumstances under which 
individuals copy others, and when 
they rely on personal experience. 
One such rule — copy when asocial 
learning is costly — has already 
been described for sticklebacks, 
but there are likely to be many 
social learning strategies in nature 
(conform, copy the most successful 
individual, copy anyone doing better 
than you, and so on) and researchers 
are only now just beginning to 
investigate them. 
The study of animal culture is 
unmasking a fascinating and rich 
interplay between two inheritance 
systems — genes and culture — in 
which each has, to some extent,  
been shaped by the other.
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